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TAX COURT DECISIONS ON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS AID BOTH TAXPAYERS AND IRS 
by 
Martin H. Zem* 
I. INTROUDUCTION 
In the complex arena of estate and gift taxation, 
controversies frequently arise between taxpayers and the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) concerning the value of 
property gifted or owed at death. Since the estate and gift taxes 
are based upon the valuation of property - determined at the 
time of death or at the time of the gift- taxpayers generally 
attempt to minimize values whereas the IRS attempts to 
maximize them. 1 
A sophisticated estate planning structure for minimizing 
values, or at least endeavoring to do so, is the family limited 
partnership. Typically, property is transferred to a newly 
formed limited partnership by a well-to-do taxpayer followed 
by transfers of partnership interests to children or other family 
members as gifts. Often, the property transferred to the 
partnership consists partly or entirely of publicly traded 
securities for which market values are readily available. The 
transfer of partnership interests may be outright, to custodial 
accounts or in trust. A valuation discount for the gifts of the 
partnership interests is then claimed for their alleged lack of 
marketability, which is based partly upon restrictions on 
*Professor, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, 
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transferability contained in the partnership agreement. A 
further discount is claimed for the fact that the partnership 
interests gifted are minority interests. Accordingly, the 
claimed value of the gift is based not upon the value of the 
publicly traded securities transferred to the partnership, but the 
allegedly considerably lower value of the partnership interests 
resulting from minority and marketability discounts. The IRS 
has attacked the family limited partnership divide over the 
years with mixed results using a variety of Internal Revenue 
Code provisions.2 [t particularly frowns on the transfer of 
publicly traded securities to a family limited partnership, 
especially where the creation of the partnership, the transfers of 
the securities to it and the gifts of the partnership interests 
occur practically simultaneously. Two Tax Court cases of 
fairly recent vintage, one decided in 2000 and another in 2004, 
favored the IRS position. The IRS was less successful, 
however, in a Tax Court case decided in May of 2008, 
Hollman v. Commissioner,3 and in a follow up case with 
similar facts decided in September of 2008, Bianca Gross v. 
Commissioner. 4 
II. EARILER TAX COURT DECISIONS FAVORING THE 
IRS. 
A Tax Court decision in 2000, Shepherd v. 
Commissioner, was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in 2002.5 
In Shepherd, the taxpayer transferred real property and shares 
of publicly traded stock to a newly-formed limited partnership 
in which he was a 50% owner and each of his two sons were 
25% owners. Rather than allocating the value of the property 
transferred to the taxpayer's capital account, the value was 
allocate, pursuant to the partnership agreement, pr rat based on 
ownership. Accordingly, 50% was allocated to the taxpayer 's 
capital account and 25% was allocated to each of the capital 
accounts of his two sons. The transfer of the property to the 
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partnership and the transfers of the interests in the partnership 
occurred on the same day. The IRS asserted that the transfer of 
the property to the partnership was an indirect gift of the 
property itself to the sons and not a gift of the partnership 
interests (with a claimed discounted value). Because the 
noncontributing partners' capital accounts were enhanced by 
the contribution of the taxpayer, the Tax Court held that the 
transfers were indirect gifts by the taxpayer to his sons of 
undivided 25-percent interests in the real property and shares 
of stock. No discounts were allowed for minority and 
marketability discounts on the gifts of the partnership interest 
to the sons. 
A Tax Court decision in 2004, Senda v. Commissioner, 
was affirmed by the Eight Circuit in 2006.6 In Senda, the 
taxpayers transferred shares of publicly traded stock to two 
family limited partnerships, coupled with transfers of limited 
partnership interests to their children. As in Shepherd, the 
transfers took place the same day. The Tax Court found: "At 
best, the transfers were integrated (as asserted by respondent) 
and, in effect, simultaneous." The transfers of the shares of 
stock to the partnerships were held to be indirect gifts of the 
shares to the children. Again, no minority and marketability 
discounts were allowed. 
Ill. HOLLMAN v. COMMISSIONER 
The Tax Court decided the Hollman case7 in May, 2008. 
The case has stirred up some controversy, but should give 
aggressive estate and gift tax practitioners some hope of 
successfully asserting minority and marketability discounts if 
the estate plan is structured correctly. On the other hand, the 
discounts allowed probably will not be as much as sought. 
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A. Facts 
The taxpayers, husband and wife, had four minor 
children. The husband, Thomas Hollman (Tom), was 
employed by Dell Computer Corp. (Dell) from 1988 through 
November of 2001. During the course of his employment, 
Tom received substantial stock options, some of which he 
exercised. Additionally, he purchased shares of Dell Stock. 
As the wealth of the taxpayers increased, they became 
concerned with managing it, particularly as to how it might 
affect their children. With this in mind, beginning in 1996 and 
continuing into 1999, they transferred Dell stock to custodial 
accounts (Under the Texas Uniform Transfers to Minors Act) 
for each of their three daughters. Tom's mother (Janelle) 
ultimately wound up as the custodian after Tom resigned. 
In 1997, the taxpayers met with an estate planning 
attorney who advised them of the gift tax savings from 
valuation discounts of gifts of limited partnership interests 
rather than of gifts of the property contributed to the limited 
partnership. In 1999, following the advice of the attorney, the 
taxpayers formed an irrevocable trust (the trust), naming 
themselves as grantors, Janelle as trustee and their children as 
beneficiaries. The taxpayers executed the trust on September 
10, 1999, Janelle executed it on November4, 1999, and the 
trust stated it was effective September l 0, 1999. One hundred 
shares of Dell stock and $10,000 were transferred into the trust. 
The taxpayers also executed a limited partnership agreement on 
November 2, 1999.8 Janelle executed it thereafter. On 
November 2, 1999, Janelle, as trustee, transferred the 100 
shares of Dell stock to the limited partnership in exchange for a 
partnership interest. On the same date, the taxpayers 
transferred 70,000 shares of Dell stock to the partnership in 
exchange for partnership interests. 
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Tom testified that the reason for setting up the family 
limited partnership was long-term growth, asset protection and 
preservation. He stated his concern that a direct gift to his 
children might de-motivate them: "We did not want our 
daughters to just go blow this money." He also stated he was 
concerned about protecting the assets from friends , spouses and 
potential creditors and wanted something to educate his 
daughters on business matters. 
On November 8, 1999, the taxpayers made a gift of 
limited partnership interests to Janelle, both as custodian under 
the state's Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) and as trustee. 
On December 13, 1999, further transfers of Dell stock, in 
exchange for partnership interests, were made from custodial 
accounts for the taxpayers' children set up under UGMA. As a 
result of the transfers, the trust wound up owning about 49% of 
the partnership interests, custodial accounts wound up owning 
about 40% of the partnership interests, and the taxpayers 
wound up owning general and limited partnership interest 
comprising the other 11%. Considerably less significant 
transfers to partnership interests were made in 200 l and 2002. 
The limited partnership agreement contained a number 
of restrictive provisions that the taxpayers claimed affected the 
value of the partnership interests. The more salient were: (1) 
restrictions on withdrawing from the partnership, (2) 
restrictions on assigning partnership interests, (3) a provision 
requiring unanimous consent of all partners to dissolve the 
partnership and wind up its affairs, and (4) a reacquisition 
provision giving the partnership the option to acquire non-
permitted assignments on favorable terms. An important 
finding of the Tax Court was that upon formation of the 
partnership, Tom had no immediate plans for it other than to 
hold Dell stock. At no time did the partnership have a business 
20 l 0/Tax Court Decisions/38 
plan and its assts consisted solely of Dell stock. Furthermore, 
the partnership had neither employees nor a telephone listing. 
The taxpayers filed gift tax returns for 1999 making a 
split gift election.9 On this basis, Tom and his wife each 
claimed a gift of $601,827. This amount was based upon an 
independent appraisal of the limited partnership interests 
transferred with the appraiser applying a hefty 49.25% discount 
from the value of the underlying Dell shares themselves. The 
value reported for each of the taxpayers on the 2000 gifts of 
partnership interests, after the same discount, was $40,000, and 
likewise for the 200 l gifts. 
On audit of the gift tax returns, the IRS claimed that the 
transfer of the Dell stock to the limited partnership was in 
substance an indirect gift of the stock to the other partners 
within the meaning of IRC § 2511. 10 As an alternative 
argument, the IRS claimed that the partnership was more 
analogous to a trust than to an operating business, and should 
be valued as such. The IRS also claimed that the restrictive 
provisions contained in the partnership agreement should be 
disregarded for valuation purposes pursuant to IRC § 
2703(a)(2).11 As another alternative argument, in the event the 
indirect transfer argument was not upheld, the IRS allowed a 
discount of only 28%, valuing each of the split gifts at 
$871,971. Similar adjustments were made for the 2001 and 
2002 gift tax returns. Overall, the IRS increased the value of 
the gifts by over $660,000. 12 
B. Tax Court Analysis 
The Court noted that it was asked to compare the facts 
at hand to the Senda and Shepherd cases. It observed that in 
both of those cases the transfer of the stock and the transfer of 
the partnership interests occurred on the same day and were 
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thus integrated transactions. The facts in the instant case were 
held to be distinguishable. On November 2, 1999, the 
partnership was formed and the taxpayers transferred 70,000 
Dell shares to it. Also, on that date, Janelle transferred 100 
Dell shares to the partnership. In exchange, the taxpayers and 
Janelle received partnership interests proportionate to the 
number of shares transferred. It was not until November 8, 
1999, 6 days later, that the taxpayers made gifts ofpartnership 
interests to Janelle both as a custodian and trustee of the trust. 
Since there were no simultaneous transfers as in the Shepherd 
and Senda cases, those cases were distinguished as being 
materially different on the facts. 
Having differentiated the Shepherd and Senda cases, 
the Court moved on to an alternative argument of the IRS, 
namely, that the transfers were indirect gifts under the "step 
transaction doctrine." Although the step transaction doctrine 
has been applied mostly in income tax cases, it has been 
applied in estate and gift tax cases. 13 
Referring to a prior Tax Court decision, 14 the Court 
observed that the step transaction doctrine combines a series of 
integrated, interdependent steps into one step if the series of 
steps are focused on a particular result. It noted that although 
there is no universal test as to when and how the step 
transaction doctrine should be applied, the courts have used 
three alternative tests: (1) binding commitment, (2) 
interdependence and (3) end result. Although the IRS did not 
explicitly state which of these tests it was relying upon, the 
Court believed that it was arguing that the " interdependence" 
test was applicable. 
Under the interdependence test the courts look to 
whether the separate steps each have legal significance or are 
so intertwined that they have significance only as part of a 
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larger transaction. The IRS noted that a Treasury Department 
regulation dealing with indirect gifts is specifically in point. 15 
Its argument in substance was that for the taxable year 1999, 
the separation in time between the first two steps (formation of 
the partnership and funding of it) and the third step (the gift of 
the partnership interests) served no purpose other than to avoid 
making an indirect gift per the regulation. 16 The Court refused 
to automatically conclude, however, that the hiatus of only 
about one week between formation and funding of the 
partnership and the gifts of the partnership interests resulted in 
the transactions being so intertwined that one step without the 
other would have been fruitless. 
In its arguments, the IRS relied heavily on Senda, 17 
where funding of the partnership and gifts of partnership 
interests occurred on the same day. The Court found Senda 
distinguishable: "The passage of time may be indicative of a 
change in circumstances that give independent significance to a 
partner's transfer of property to a partnership and the 
subsequent gift of an interest in that partnership to another." 
Highly relevant was the Court's observation that stock values 
could significantly change within one week. In fact, the Dell 
stock went down 1.316 percent within one week. Although 
this may not seem like much, based on the time elapsed, the 
rate of change was noted to be greater than the changes that 
took place in subsequent longer relative periods. The IRS even 
conceded that a two-month delay from funding to gifts would 
give independent significance to the two steps. The Court did 
not draw any "bright line" test as to how much time must 
elapse between the funding of a partnership and a gift of 
partnership units for there to be economic risk of a change in 
the value ofthe partnership units gifted. 18 Based on the facts 
of the case, it concluded that the 1999 gifts of partnership units 
was not an indirect gift of Dell shares. 
41N ol. 24/North East Journal of Legal Studies 
After determining hat there was no indirect gift of Dell 
Shares, but rather a gift of limited partnership interests, the 
Court next concentrated on valuing the interests. In this regard, 
it focused on Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 2703. In 
pertinent part, I.R.C. § 2703(a) provides that the value of gifted 
property is determined without regard to any restriction on the 
right to sell or use such property. However, I.R.C. § 2703(b) 
states that I.R.C. § 2703(a) shall not apply if the restriction 
meets each of three requirements: 
( l) It is a bona fide business arrangement. 
(2) It is not a device to transfer the gifted property to 
members of the decedent's 19 family for less than full 
and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. 
(3) Its terms are comparable to similar arrangements 
entered into by persons in an arm's length transaction. 
The partnership contained several relevant restrictions: 
(I) with limited exceptions, a restriction on assigning a 
partnership interest without consent of all of the partners, (2) 
an option to reacquire the interest transferred in the event of a 
non-permitted assignment, and (3) restrictions on payouts to 
reacquire a non-permitted assignment. The taxpayers argued 
that these restrictions served a bona fide business purpose by 
preventing interests in the partnership from passing to non-
family members citing a number of cases in support of their 
argument.20 The IRS on the other hand argued that the 
transaction was not a bona fide business arrangement since 
"carrying on a business" requires more than holding securities 
and keeping records, citing a 1941 Supreme Court income tax 
case, Higgins v. Commissioner.2 1 Moreover, it observed that 
the taxpayers primary purpose in forming the partnership, to 
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preserve their wealth and educate their children about it, were 
both personal and business goals. 
The Court observed that I.R.C. § 2703 does not contain 
a definition of the phrase "bona fide business arrangement." 
However, the Court noted that there could be a bona fide 
business arrangement without an actively managed business, 
citing Estate of Amlie v. Commissioner.22 In that case, the 
Court held that a fiduciary's efforts to hedge risk and planning 
for liquidity needs of a decedent's estate constitute business 
purposes under I.R.C. § 2703(b )( l ). The Court then went on to 
observe that although buy-sell agreements serve a legitimate 
purpose in maintaining control of a business, this does not 
necessarily exclude the possibility that such an agreement is a 
tax-avoidance testamentary divide to be disregarded in valuing 
the property interest. 
Reviewing the legislative history of J.R.C. § 2703(b )(I), 
the Court concluded that the restrictions in the partnership 
agreement in this case did not constitute a bona fide business 
arrangement. First of all, there was no closely held business to 
protect. The restrictions served principally to discourage 
dissipation by the children of the family wealth. This was 
different than the value fixing arrangements in Estate of 
Amlie,23 which involved a conservator seeking to exercise 
prudent management of investments for his ward and to 
provide for the liquidity needs of her estate. 
The Court then focused on whether the second 
requirement for disregarding the restrictions in the partnership 
agreement, I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2), was met. This provision 
mandates that the restriction not be a divide to transfer property 
to members of the decedent' s24 fami I y for inadequate 
consideration. The Court concluded that the restrictions were 
such a divide. The purpose of the partnership restrictions was 
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to discourage the taxpayer's children from dissipating the 
wealth transferred to them. If a child made an impermissible 
transfer, the child would not realize the difference between fair 
market value of his partnership unit and the unit's 
proportionate share of the partnership's net asset value. 
Further, if a child made an impermissible transfer, the 
partnership could redeem the interest transferred from the 
transferee for less than the net asset value proportionate to the 
impermissible transferee's interest in the partnership. The 
difference in value would inure to the benefit of the remaining 
children and therefore be a redistribution of wealth from a child 
pursuing an impermissible transfer to the remaining children, 
an impermissible "device." 
The third requirement that must be met for restriction to 
be disregarded in valuation, I.R.C. § 2703(b )(3), is that the 
restriction be comparable to similar arrangements entered into 
by persons in an arm's-length transaction. Comfsarability is 
determined at the time the restriction is created. 5 In this 
regard, there was a battle between expert witnesses. The IRS 
expert, a law professor, testified that in his opinion - based 
upon his experience and conversations with numerous 
practitioners- it was unlikely that a person in an arm's-length 
transaction would accept the pertinent restrictions in the 
partnership agreement. 
The taxpayers called another law professor as its expert 
who had practiced, written and lectured about partnership 
taxation and law for more than 20 years, and who had drafted 
numerous limited partnership agreements. His testimony was 
that the restrictions were comparable to provisions often found 
in partnership agreements among unrelated partners or were 
not out of the mainstream. Here, the Court seemed to fudge a 
little, stating that even if it found that the restrictions were 
similar to arrangement entered into in an arm's length 
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transaction satisfying I.R.C. § 2703(b )(3), it would still not 
disregard the restriction since they did not constitute a bona 
fide business arrangement under I.R.C. § 2703(b )(I), and were 
a prohibited device under I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2). Accordingly, it 
determined that it did not have to decide whether the IRS or the 
taxpayer was correct in applying the arm's-length standard of 
I.R.C. § 2703(b)(3).26 
As a final matter, the Court had to address to what 
extent minority and marketability discounts should be allowed, 
disregarding any marketability discount attributable to 
restrictions in the partnership agreement. Since the contending 
parties agreed that such discounts should be allowed, the battle 
then became one of the expert witnesses as to the specific 
discount percentages. The Court then went into lengthy 
discussion of the testimony and methodologies of the experts. 
The minority discounts claimed by the experts different for 
each o the three years at issue. Following are the respective 
discounts claimed by the parties and the amount ultimately 

















With respect to a marketability discount, the amount 
claimed by the parties did not differ from year to year. The 
expert for the taxpayers testified that his analysis supported a 
marketability discount of at least 35%, settling on that amount 
as his testimony, whereas the IRS expert estimated that the 
marketability discount should be only 12.5%. The Court 
adopted the latter figure. Accordingly, it is clear that the 
opinion of the IRS expert as to both minority and marketability 
discounts held greater sway with the Court. In dollar terms, the 
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discounts allowed reduced the size of the taxable gifts by 
approximately $607,000. 
IV. BIANCE GROSS v. COMMISSIONER 
As noted earlier, the Tax Court decided Bianca Gross v. 
Commissione/7 in September of2008, a few months after its 
Hollman decision. The decision in Biance Gross was rendered 
by the same judge. 
Over a period of about three months in 1998, the 
taxpayer transferred in excess of $2 million of publicly traded 
stock to a limited partnership she had formed. Eleven days 
after the final transfer to the partnership, the taxpayer gifted 
22.5 percent partnership interests to each of her two daughters. 
The taxpayer was the sole general partner. She testified that 
the purpose for forming the limited partnership was to have her 
two daughters working together in handling the family wealth. 
A combined minority and marketability discount of 35% was 
claimed on the gifts of the partnership interests. The IRS 
asserted that no discounts should be allowed raising essentially 
the same argument that it had asserted in Hollman, namely, that 
there was an indirect gift of the securities themselves. Again, 
the IRS also raised its "step transaction" argument. 
Applying its Hollman rationale, the Court held that the 
ll days that transpired between the funding of the partnership 
and the gifts of partnership units posed a real economic risk 
that the partnership's value would change during this time. 
This was especially true since the property transferred to the 
partnership was heavily-traded, volatile common stocks. The 
IRS had stipulated to the taxpayer' s 35% discount if it lost on 
the indirect gift argument and this is the discount that the Court 
adopted. It should be noted that the combined discount 
ultimately adopted by the Court in Hollman with respect to the 
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major gift of partnership units in 1999 came to only about 25%. 
It is not clear why the IRS stipulated to a higher percentage. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Overall, Hollman is a significant taxpayer victory 
although the IRS got in its licks winning the I.R.C. § 2703 
argument. Siding with the taxpayers, the Court held that the 
gifts were of limited partnership interest rather than indirect 
gifts of stock. This finding resulted in the Court accepting that 
minority and marketability discounts of the limited partnership 
gifts were appropriate. Favoring the IRS, however, no discount 
was allowed for the restrictions in the partnership agreement 
since I.R.C. § 2703 was found applicable mandating that these 
restrictions be disregarded. Consequently, the taxpayers did 
not get as large of a minority and marketability discount on the 
limited partnership interest gifted as they claimed. One may 
speculate though that the taxpayers did not expect to get the 
discounts claimed and perhaps hoped that the judge would 
proverbially "split the baby in half." As noted, however, the 
Court for the most part sided with the IRS on the amount of 
discounts to be allowed mostly adopting those offered by the 
IRS expert. Significantly, the IRS was successful in 
interposing I.R.C. § 2703 as being applicable to the Hollman 
type of situation involving publicly traded securities. 
Restrictions in a limited partnership agreement are often put in 
for the principal purpose, or at least a major one, of increasing 
the amount claimed for a marketability discount. So, although 
some discount was allowed for marketability in Hollman, the 
effect of disregarding such restrictions was to reduce the 
amount of discount. 
Hollman may perhaps present a roadmap for obtaining 
discounts on transfers of publicly held stock into a limited 
partnership followed by gifts of the partnership interests. 
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Clearly, there must be a hiatus between the two events. In 
Hollman, the break was about one week. The Court in a 
footnote, however, noted that its decision might have been 
different if the property being transferred were less volatile, 
such as preferred stock or treasury bonds. The Court did not 
give any guidance as to how long the hiatus must be, although 
as noted, the IRS seems to conclude that a two-month delay 
would suffice. In this regard, the IRS did not dispute that a 
sufficient period of time had elapsed between the formation of 
the limited partnership and the gifts of the partnership units in 
2000 and 2001. Clearly, a taxpayer's position is stronger the 
longer the delay between the two events, taking into account 
the volatility of the securities transferred. In Bianca Gross, the 
taxpayers were, of course, on even more stable ground where 
the hiatus was 11 days. 
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1 (b )(1 )(ii), which substitutes "the natural objects of the 
transferor's bounty" for the phrase "members of the decedent' s 
family" apparently because I.R.C. § 2703 is interpreted as 
being applicable to both transfers at death and during lifetime. 
20 c· . . d 1tat10ns om1tte . 
21 312 u.s. 212 (1941). 
22 T.C. Memo 2006-76. 
23 !d. 
24 Supra, Note 19. 
25 Reg.§ 25.2703-l(b)(l)(iii). 
26 Actually, the Court did not have to consider the applicability 
ofi.R.C. § 2703(b)(2) either since I.R.C. § 2703(b)(l) was 
failed. Each of the provisions, (b )(1 ), (b )(2) and (b )(3) have to 
be met for l.R.C. § 2703 to be disregarded. For some reason 
the Court reviewed the applicability of I.R.C. § 2703(b )(2) 
although technically it did not have to. Perhaps it felt that 
failing two out of the three requirements for disregarding I.R.C. 
§ 2703 buttressed its holding. In any event, the restrictions in 
the partnership agreement were disregarded in valuing the 
y
7
artnership units gifted. 
Supra, Note 4. 
